Ethiopia, Somalia: Stalemate at Baidoa

STRATFOR

Summary

Following the July 19 capture by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) of a town near Baidoa, Somalia, where the Somalian Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is based, Ethiopia sent a column of vehicles and troops to Baidoa. The takeover of the town near Baidoa was most likely an ICU probe of the extent of Ethiopia’s commitment to the TFG, rather than a planned attack on Baidoa aborted by the Ethiopians’ arrival. The resulting stalemate between the two sides looks to continue until they find common ground, as the ICU lacks the ability take Baidoa, while Ethiopia cannot hope to operate outside Baidoa.

Analysis

The Ethiopian military sent a convoy of over 100 trucks and armored cars to the city of Baidoa, Somalia, on July 20 to defend Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is based in Baidoa, from militias loyal to Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The arrival of the Ethiopian convoy follows the ICU’s July 19 capture of the town of Burhakaba, approximately 37 miles from Baidoa. The Ethiopian government said after the capture that it would invade Somalia to defend the TFG if the ICU moves against Baidoa.

The capture of Burhakaba was most likely a test by the ICU of Ethiopia’s response to a potential attack on Baidoa. The Ethiopian government has consistently given strong support to the TFG, and indicated on several occasions that it would not tolerate an attack on Baidoa. The ICU now knows the Ethiopians mean what they said, and that it will not be able to topple the TFG without Ethiopia’s becoming involved. A stalemate will most likely ensue between the two sides, since the ICU cannot expect to capture a fortified position held by the Ethiopian army, while Ethiopia will not be able to operate outside of Baidoa, and Ethiopia’s allies in the TFG lack influence beyond Baidoa.

Reports of Ethiopian troops in Baidoa have circulated for several weeks. There are now as many as 5,000 Ethiopian troops in Somalia, with thousands more massed on the border. The Baidoa airport is in the process of having its landing strip widened so Ethiopian military planes can land there. Following the Ethiopian convoy’s departure for Baidoa, the ICU said July 20 it has never had any plan to attack Baidoa, and began to draw down its forces in Burhakaba. The ICU said it entered the Baidoa area to pick up approximately 150 soldiers who defected from the TFG to join the ICU.

Ethiopia has a vested interest in keeping the ICU from controlling all of Somalia. Ethiopia has said the ICU has received arms from Eritrea, a government hostile to Ethiopia, and thus Addis Ababa is not excited about the prospect of having two hostile neighbors potentially cooperating against it. Furthermore, Ethiopia is nervous about the possibility of the ICU stirring up trouble in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, populated by ethnic Somalis and already the site of unrest. Ethiopia, however, will not be able to operate in Somalia outside Baidoa.

Historically, there is no love lost between Ethiopia and Somalia, and Ethiopia could almost certainly count upon forceful resistance by Somalians to any Ethiopian operations outside of Baidoa. Moving outside Baidoa would stretch Ethiopia’s supply lines farther and farther, opening it to attacks from the rear and guerrilla operations. Ultimately, Ethiopia would become bogged down in an unmanageable occupation and faced with an insurgency in a country where weapons and fighters abound. Indeed, even to maintain its current position, Ethiopia must not to lose its supply lines to Baidoa, or it risks a prolonged siege without the possibility of relief.

On the other hand, the ICU cannot expect its militias successfully to engage the Ethiopian army and take a city defended by a military with all of its various accoutrements. Ethiopia has more troops to draw upon than the ICU, and the ICU has yet to fight an actual army. Ethiopia also enjoys the advantage of only having to defend a fortified position — which is becoming more and more fortified — against a possible ground assault.

Furthermore, just as Ethiopia risks drawing out its supply lines to the breaking point if it moves beyond Baidoa, the ICU risks overextending itself if it moves to attack Baidoa. Any assault on Baidoa would require moving numerous soldiers to the vicinity, and doing so would expose the ICU to the risk of opportunistic warlords and subclan leaders using the fighting to take back large chunks of Mogadishu and other territories the ICU recently captured. Though the ICU is in no position to attack the TFG, it did make the symbolic gesture July 20 of threatening a jihad against Ethiopian troops on Somalian territory.

The TFG is not strong enough to resist an attack by the ICU without Ethiopian help, but by inviting Ethiopian troops on to Somalian soil, it has probably lost whatever small amount of legitimacy it had in the eyes of Somalians. Isolated since the emergence of the ICU, the TFG now must struggle even harder to fight the perception it is an Ethiopian pawn.

The TFG still enjoys the nominal support of the international community, and thus any actions carried out in its name by Ethiopia may receive international support — and any attack on Baidoa by the ICU would likely draw international condemnation.

Both sides are engaged in posturing, in an attempt to force their opponents to make greater concessions in possible future negotiations. As the situation now stands, there is a stalemate, with the TFG enjoying the international recognition the ICU desires, but the ICU controlling the vast majority of Somalia’s territory ostensibly governed by the TFG. And though the TFG cannot expand its authority beyond Baidoa, the ICU cannot claim total legitimacy as a government as long as the TFG exists.

© Copyright 2006 Strategic Forecasting Inc.